Case study — we ran our own anti-impersonation product on our own domain
Self-demo of BossBot Anti-Impersonation against bossbot.uk. In 30 seconds the scanner surfaced 5 registered typosquat domains + generated a signed takedown package addressed to the actual registrar's abuse contact.
We ran our own anti-impersonation product on our own domain
TL;DR — we ran BossBot Anti-Impersonation against bossbot.uk
this afternoon (2026-07-20). In 30 seconds it found 5 registered
bossbot.* domains, ran WHOIS on each to resolve the registrar's
abuse contact, and generated a signed takedown package for the
most-suspicious one. Then we ran HTTP GET on each to separate parked
squatters from active infrastructure. Two out of five look like
genuine post-launch impersonation attempts. Full data below.
The rest of this post walks through the raw findings, how the workflow
resolved contacts, and what we learned about our own scanner while
running it on ourselves.
Why we did this
We built the Anti-Impersonation module to give SMBs the same
brand-protection workflow that Bolster ($8K+/yr) and PhishLabs
($20K+/yr) reserve for enterprise. Before selling it, the honest
test is: does it work on our own brand?
Answer: yes — with two caveats we found and fixed during the run.
The scan (30 seconds)
$ python -m bossbot.anti_impersonation run_scan \
--client bossbot_sales --domain bossbot.uk --name BossBot
[antiimp] bossbot.uk: 5 typosquats registered, 0 social handles
Five results, all registered:
bossbot.orgbossbot.cobossbot.netbossbot.iobossbot.biz
Registered ≠ impersonating. Some are old squatters; some are recent
registrations that could actually be impersonation attempts. Without
context, they look identical. So the tool ran WHOIS on each and we
ran HTTP GET on each to separate the piles.
WHOIS enrichment
The takedown module shells out to whois and extracts registrar,
creation date, and abuse contact via four fallback regex patterns:
| Domain | Registrar | Created | Abuse contact |
|---|---|---|---|
bossbot.biz |
Global Domain Group LLC | 2026-06-19 | [email protected] |
bossbot.org |
NameCheap, Inc. | 2025-02-26 | [email protected] |
bossbot.co |
GoDaddy.com, LLC | 2016-10-07 | [email protected] |
bossbot.net |
GoDaddy.com, LLC | 2016-10-07 | [email protected] |
bossbot.io |
Network Solutions | 2023-11-21 | [email protected] |
Two things jumped out:
.bizwas registered a month ago. Post-BossBot-launch. High
suspicion..coand.netwere registered on the exact same day in 2016
by the same registrar. Same owner, bulk-registered, decade-old
squatters — not impersonators.
We also found a coverage gap: our first pass didn't parse .co
because the default whois server (whois.nic.co) DNS-resolved
inconsistently on our VPS. We added a per-TLD fallback map
(.co → whois.godaddy.com, .io → whois.nic.io, etc.) and got
100 % parse coverage. Fix is in the linked commit.
Live-or-parked check
WHOIS says who owns a domain, but not what they're doing with it.
Curl'ing each domain says a lot more:
| Domain | HTTP status | Body |
|---|---|---|
bossbot.biz |
520 (Cloudflare error) | Cloudflare-fronted, origin unreachable |
bossbot.org |
403 (awselb/2.0) |
AWS Elastic Load Balancer with auth wall |
bossbot.co |
200 → /lander |
GoDaddy parked domain landing page |
bossbot.net |
200 → /lander |
Same GoDaddy parked landing (byte-identical to .co) |
bossbot.io |
406 (Apache) | Old misconfigured server |
New ranking after HTTP verification:
- 🔴
bossbot.biz— recent registration + Cloudflare front +
origin down. Classic infrastructure setup for a
domain-being-prepared-for-something. Highest priority. - 🟡
bossbot.org— AWS ELB behind a 403 auth wall. Someone
deployed real infrastructure at this hostname. Could be legit
(staging, personal project) or could be impersonation behind a
login screen. Needs a manual look. - ⚪
bossbot.co/.net— parked, same owner, decade-old. Not
urgent. - ⚪
bossbot.io— pre-brand misconfigured server, ambient noise.
The takedown package
We hit "Start takedown" on bossbot.biz in the dashboard. In a few
hundred milliseconds:
- Contact resolved —
[email protected](via WHOIS). - Email template rendered with our real business context
(BossBot (KZENOFFRAME STUDIO LLC),bossbot.uk) — subject
Trademark abuse / phishing report — bossbot.biz impersonating bossbot.uk. - HMAC signature over
(takedown_id, client_id, target, initiated_at)— cryptographic
receipt that BossBot generated this at 2026-07-20 12:55 UTC.
Tampering with any of those four fields invalidates the signature. - Evidence pack — signed PDF (~30 KB) with cover page,
structured tables, HMAC watermark on every page footer, and raw
WHOIS output at generation time. Suitable for registrar abuse
forms or attaching to legal counsel briefings. Plain-text
fallback available at.txtendpoint for callers that can't
handle PDF.
The customer's workflow ends here: open the mail client (mailto: link
pre-fills subject + body), send the abuse message, attach the
evidence pack, come back to the dashboard, mark as sent. Status
transitions all the way through sent → responded → resolved.
What we're actually doing with these findings
Transparency, not marketing:
bossbot.biz— the takedown package is ready in our dashboard
as adraft. We're not sending it yet. Cloudflare+520 is
suspicious but not proof of impersonation. Before filing an abuse
complaint we'll: (a) monitor DNS + HTTP daily for a week, (b) see
if origin ever recovers, (c) check MX records for phishing-prep
patterns.bossbot.org— we're going to email the AWS ELB endpoint's
Registrant Organization directly (from NameCheap WHOIS) and ask
what they're doing. Might be a legit hobby project..co,.net,.io— no action. Squatting is legal; if we
want them we'd buy them, not report them.
What the run told us about our own product
Two real improvements landed the same day:
.coWHOIS parser — added TLD-specific fallback server map.- Social handle scanner returned 0 for
bossbot.uk— either we
have no active social presence to compare against (possible: our
brand is very new) or the scanner needs coverage improvements.
Manual audit next week.
Two things worked exactly as designed:
- Idempotency — running the scan twice creates ONE row per
finding, not five.scan_countbumps,first_seen_atstays put. - HMAC receipts — regenerated the evidence pack a minute later,
byte-identical to the first. Deterministic signing means the
customer can prove exactly what BossBot generated at exactly what
time, months later.
The pitch
If you own a domain that customers depend on, some fraction of the
character-substitution variants are already registered. Some are
harmless squatters. Some aren't. The difference matters.
BossBot Anti-Impersonation: $29/month. Weekly scans, WHOIS-
enriched findings, mailto-ready abuse templates, HMAC-signed evidence
packs. The workflow that comparable enterprise tools charge
$8,000+/year for, delivered in the SMB tier.
Sign up: bossbot.uk/antiimp-signup
Or email [email protected] and we'll run a free scan on your
domain first. Same output as above — 30 seconds, honest report.
Written 2026-07-20 by the founder. Commit refs:
315248a6 (data model), 84655d72 (findings UI), 871a7afb (takedown
workflow), b5766b04 (alerts + digest), 3ee0714e (product un-gated
for sale).
Want us to run this on your domain?
Free scan — same output as above, 30 seconds. Or start a $29/mo subscription and get weekly scans + takedown workflow.
Start Anti-Impersonation — $29/mo Or email for a free scan